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The spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a
loyalty eﬀect driving the choice of parties’ platforms during elections. There
emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party
sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to approach
the position of the median voter, whose pivotal role is also investigated.
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After Downs’s (1957) pioneering work, a very large stream of literature has
investigated spatial voting models to study parties’ strategic behaviour and
predict the outcome of elections. The spatial approach has been extended in
several directions, to account for, e.g., stochastic voting (Anderson, Kats and
Thisse 1994; Adams, 1999; Patty, 2005; Schoﬁeld, 2006); parties’ (or candi-
dates’) incomplete information or bounded rationality (Kollman, Miller and
Page, 1992; Page, Kollman and Miller, 1993; Kollman, Miller and Page,
1997); multidimensional platforms with valence issues (Ansolabehere and
Snyder, 2000); the existence of majority-rule equilibria in spatial voting
games (Bartholdi, Narasimhan and Tovey, 1991).1
The aim of the present paper is to extend the spatial approach in order
to investigate the bearings of parties’ traditional platforms, as inherited from
history, on their strategies and ultimately on the outcome of electoral com-
petition. When I refer to the presence of traditional platforms, I mean what
follows. Any given party may take from its past history some essential fea-
tures conditioning its views on relevant policy issues, such as monetary and
ﬁscal policy, welfare, foreign policy, etc., so much so that they end up shaping
to a large extent the choice of such a party’s platform during the elections.
This aspect, which to the best of my knowledge has been overlooked thus
far, may in fact play a relevant role, as it can be easily ascertained on the
basis of casual observation.
For instance, this clearly appears to be the case if one looks at the political
1Relevant contributions adopting a spatial approach to investigate other aspects of
electoral competition are virtually uncountable. See, e.g., Weber (1992), Adams (1999),
McKelvey and Patty (2006) and Huck, Knoblauch and Muller (2006).
1elections held in Italy in April 2006, with particular regard to behaviour of
the center-left during the last two weeks of the electoral campaign, when Mr
Romano Prodi’s public speeches and declarations were increasingly stressing
the need to increase taxation (or introduce new taxes) on large patrimonies
and high incomes so as to make the distribution of income in Italy less unfair.
How much large and high these were supposed to be, remained a vague
concept until the new government produced the new ﬁscal law. Yet, these
declaration of intents produced the eﬀect (predictable but clearly - and quite
strangely indeed - unforeseen by the center-left itself) of decreasing their
margin of consensus over the center-right coalition to such an extent that the
outcome of the elections was pretty tight, being determined by a few thousand
votes only. It is a widely accepted interpretation that such declarations were
dictated not by a risk-loving attitude but rather from the will (or need) to
satisfy some essential (or tradition-driven) requirements of the communist
components of the coalition led by Mr Prodi.
To model this issue, I propose an extension of the standard two-party
spatial voting approach to explicitly account for the presence of a loyalty
eﬀect in the objective function of each party, in addition to the extent of
electoral consensus. The main results of the ensuing analysis can be sum-
marised as follows. If the loyalty eﬀect is low enough, both parties choose
the median voter’s preferred platform; as a consequence, the outcome of the
elections is indeterminate. Otherwise, the outcome of the elections is deter-
mined by a non-trivial interplay between the loyalty eﬀect and the parties’
locations around the median voter. This interplay also entails that, when-
ever at least one party locates apart from the median voter, the latter will
be pivotal, unlike what happens in the usual approach where both parties
2locate in correspondence of the median voter’s preferred platform.
2T h e m o d e l
Examine the following two-party electoral competition game. Parties 1 and
2 choose their respective electoral (or political) platforms in [0,1], with
x1 ∈ [0,1/2] and x2 ∈ [1/2,1]. The unit interval deﬁnes the support of the
distribution of voters’ electoral preferences, which I assume to be uniform.
for the sake of simplicity I also assume that all voters indeed vote (either for
party 1 or for party 2), so that the total amount of votes is equal to one.
The generic voter, located at point m ∈ [0,1], votes for the party (or the
candidate) whose political platform xi maximises:
U = s − t(m − xi)
2 , (1)
where s>0 is the gross value that any individual associates with the fact
itself of voting, while parameter t>0 measures the disutility of voting for
a party whose platform diﬀers form the voter’s ideal one.2 The voter who is
indiﬀerent between candidate 1 and candidate 2 is identiﬁed by the following
condition:
s − t(e m − x1)
2 = s − t(e m − x2)
2 (2)





2The use of a linear disutility function would not entail any signiﬁcant change in the
qualitative conclusions of the model.
3entailing that the amount of voters located in (x1,x 2) will split evenly. Using









So far, the setup closely replicate Down’s (1957). Should vi deﬁne the ob-
jective function of party i, the voting paradox would obtain. Instead, I will
pose that party (or candidate) i’s objective function is deﬁned by:
Oi = vi − bi (µi − xi)
2 , (5)
where:
• µi ∈ [0,1], with µ1 <µ 2,µ 1 ∈ [0,1/2] and µ2 ∈ [1/2,1], is the platform
that ideally party i would adopt if there were no incentive at all to
capture the preferences of voters located far away from µi. An intuitive
interpretation of µi is that it may represent a traditional platform that
party i h a si n h e r i t e df r o mi t sp r e v i o u sh i s t o r y ;
• bi (µi − xi)
2 , with bi ≥ 0, is the cost (either real or psychological) asso-
ciated with departing from the ideal/historical platform µi.3 This cost
component describes the loyalty eﬀect felt by party i to the its historical
heritage, such loyalty becoming stronger as parameter bi increases.
3A similar cost function has been used in the economic model describing product lo-
cation or diﬀerentiation in the Hotelling (1929) vein, to describe a taxation rule that a
policy maker could adopt as a remedy to the excess diﬀerentiation caused by ﬁrms’ proﬁts
incentives. To this regard, see Lambertini (1997).
4The noncooperative one-shot game takes place under imperfect, symmet-
ric and complete information. Party i must choose its electoral platform xi
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1+4 b1 (µ1 − x1)
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4b2 (µ2 − x2) − 1
2
=0 ,
yielding the Nash equilibrium platforms:
x
∗










1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ x∗




, b1 ; b2 ≥
1
2(2µ2 − 1)
, b2 . (9)
It is easily checked that conditions x∗
1 > 0a n dx∗
2 < 1 are met for all µ1 ∈
[0,1/2] and µ2 ∈ [1/2,1]. By looking at (8), one can immediately state:
Lemma 1 x∗
i ∈ [µ1,µ 2], with ∂x∗
1/∂b1 < 0 and ∂x∗
2/∂b2 > 0.
In words, the above Lemma states that both parties ﬁnd it optimal to
abandon their traditional platforms and relocate towards the median voter,
the more so the lower is the (psychological or real) cost associated to relo-
cation. Consequently, the degree of diﬀerentiation between the two electoral
p l a t f o r m si sd e c r e a s i n gi nb o t hbi’s. Lemma 1 implies a relevant corollary:
5Corollary 2 If bi ≤ bi,i=1 ,2, then x∗
i =1 /2.
This means that if party i’s cost of relocating away from the traditional
is suﬃciently low, then this party will indeed choose the platform preferred
by the median voter. Given that, in general, bi is not symmetric across
parties/candidates, this may well hold for one but not for the other.
Given that if bi ≤ bi for both i, then both parties choose the platform
preferred by the median voter, Corollary 2 has the following straightforward
implication:
Proposition 3 The condition
©
b1 ≤ b1,b 2 ≤ b2
ª
is necessary and suﬃcient
to make the outcome of the elections undetermined.
Now, provided
©
b1 > b1,b 2 > b2
ª
, then plugging expressions (8) into (4)
one obtains the explicit electoral outcome in term of vote shares, for all
x∗





b2 [1 + 4b1 (µ1 + µ2)] − b1
8b1b2




b1 − b2 [1 + 4b1 (µ1 + µ2 − 2)]
8b1b2
. (11)
To begin with, one has to look at the non-negativity requirements for expres-




1 ≥ 0 ⇔ b2 + b1 [4b2 (µ1 + µ2) − 1] ≥ 0. (12)
This is surely true for all b2 ≥ 1/[4(µ1 + µ2)], with 1/[4(µ1 + µ2)] < b2 for




2 ≥ 0 ⇔ b1 − b2 [1 + 4b1 (µ1 + µ2 − 2)] ≥ 0( 1 3 )
6which is surely true for all b1 ≥ 1/[4(2 − µ1 − µ2)], with 1/[4(2 − µ1 − µ2)] <
b1 for all admissible values of µ1 and µ2. Hence, v∗
i > 0 and consequently
v∗
j < 1f o ra l lbj < bj,i6= j, i,j =1 ,2. Accordingly:
Lemma 4
©
b1 > b1,b 2 > b2
ª
suﬃces to ensure {v∗
1 ∈ (0,1),v ∗
2 ∈ (0,1)}.
It is worth noting that the above Lemma essentially rules out unanimity
( i nf a v o u ro fe i t h e rp a r t y )a sl o n ga sx∗
i 6=1 /2,i=1 ,2. The next step
consists in establishing the condition(s) on the basis of which party 1 wins
(i.e., v∗
1 > 1/2 or, equivalently, v∗
1 >v ∗
2)i ﬀ:
b2 − b1 [1 + 4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2)] > 0. (14)
Therefore, we have three alternative cases:
Case I: If µ2 =1− µ1, then we have
sign{v
∗




2} =s i g n{b2 − b1}. (15)
This amounts to saying that, if historical platforms are symmetric
around the median voter, then party 1 (respectively, 2) wins for all
b1 <b 2 (resp., b2 <b 1).
Case II: If µ2 > 1 − µ1 and b2 ≥ 1/[4(µ1 + µ2 − 1)], then v∗
1 > 1/2 for all
admissible values of b1.
Case III: If either (i) 1 <µ 1 + µ2 and b2 < 1/[4(µ1 + µ2 − 1)] (which is
necessary to ensure that 1 + 4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) > 0), or (ii) 1 ≥ µ1 +µ2
(which suﬃces to ensure that 1 + 4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) > 0f o ra l lb2 > 0),
then v∗
1 > 1/2f o ra l l
b1 <
b2
1+4 b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2)
,b b1 . (16)
7and conversely if the opposite inequality holds. Note that condition
(16) is non linear w.r.t. b2 for all µ2 6=1−µ1. In the special case where
µ2 =1− µ1, (16) trivially reduces to b1 <b 2.
Of course, in view of the symmetry of the model, similar conclusions
would hold, mutatis mutandis, if one examined the condition v∗
2 > 1/2.
Observe that Case II describes a situation where µ1 > 1−µ2, which amounts
to saying that party 1’s historical platform is closer to the extreme left than
party 2’s one is to the extreme right. In light of this, intuitively, it appears
that there exists a critical threshold of b2 above which party 1 is the winner
irrespective of how painful may be for party 1 itself to choose any x∗
1 6= µ1.
In Case III, it is necessary to check whether inequality (16) is compatible
with (9), i.e., the sign of b b1 − b1,a sl o n ga s1+4 b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) > 0:
b b1 − b1 =
1+2 b2 (2µ2 − 1)
2(1− 2µ1)[1+4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2)]
R 0f o ra l lb2 R b2. (17)
This immediately entails:
Lemma 5 The sign of b1 −b b1 reveals the outcome of the elections outside
the region
©
b1 ≤ b1,b 2 ≤ b2
ª
.
Having established this, I may now proceed to characterise the electoral
outcome in the non trivial cases where at least one party’s platform diﬀers
from the median voter’s. When 1+4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) > 0, the overall picture
of the equilibrium outcome is represented by Figure 1, where:
• in regions A and F, platforms are x∗
1 = x∗
2 =1 /2 everywhere; therefore,
the outcome of the elections is undetermined;
• in region B, party 1 wins, with platforms x∗
1 =1 /2,x ∗
2 > 1/2;
8• in region C, party 1 wins with platforms x∗
1 < 1/2 <x ∗
2;
• in region D, party 2 wins, with platforms x∗
1 < 1/2 <x ∗
2;
• in region E, party 2 wins, with platforms x∗














Figure 1 is drawn for µ2 6=1− µ1. If instead µ2 =1− µ1, (16) coincides
with the 45◦ line and therefore the graph becomes fully symmetric.
Accordingly, I may sum up the forgoing discussion in:
9Theorem 6 Consider the range
©
b1 > b1,b 2 > b2
ª
. In this parameter region,
the outcome of the elections can be characterised as follows:
• Take 1+4 b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) < 0. If so, then party 1 wins the elections
for all b1 ≥ b1.




, party 1 wins the
elections; for all b1 > b b1, party 2 wins; for b1 = b b1, the indiﬀerent
(median) voter is pivotal.
In order to complete the picture, it is now worth discussing brieﬂyt h er e l a -
tionship between b2 andb b1, in the parameter range where 1+4b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2) >
0. This is easily done by observing that
b2 > b b1 ⇔ 1 >
1
1+4 b2 (1 − µ1 − µ2)
, (18)
which is always true in the relevant parameter range.
To conclude the analysis, the particular case where b1 = b2 can be inves-
tigated closely. Here, we have
sign{v
∗










2 ⇐⇒ µ1 > 1 − µ2 (20)
and conversely. Hence, we have:
Corollary 7 If b1 = b2, then the party whose traditional platform is closest
to the median voter wins the elections.
103 Concluding remarks
I have investigated the role of political parties’ loyalty to their historical
heritage, the choice of their political platforms and ultimately the outcome
of elections. The foregoing analysis has highlighted that, unless the weight
attached to history is low enough, the outcome of elections is determinate
and driven by a party’s capability of adjusting its own electoral platform to
the political preferences of the voters located around the median one. That
is, being characterised by either (i) a less compelling historical heritage, or
(ii) a traditional platform closer to the position of the median voter than the
rival, entails per se no warranty of victory. Depending on the relative weight
of these two factors, the winner may well be a party that, judging from its
history, is farther away from the median voter but can approach him/her
during the elections at a relatively lower cost than the rival, or, conversely,
ap a r t yt h a ts u ﬀers from a relatively higher stickiness with respect to its
tradition but is lucky enough to ﬁnd itself closer to the median voter precisely
thanks to such historical tradition.
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